09. Bargaining

1. Nash

016: Nash Bargaining I This video proves that Nash’s utility method to bargaining leads to unfairness.
017: Nash Bargaining II This video proves that Nash’s exchange does not result in his Pareto Optimum.
018: Nash Bargaining III This video proves that Nash’s exchange is nothing but Ricardo’s trade theory, without any solution to the gain from trade.
027: Bargaining in a Box This video reveals the many possibilities of solving the bargaining problem with the Edgeworth box.
029: Lindahl & Bargaining This video shows that in case of benefit everybody wants more.
031: UPC & Bargaining This video proves that social indifference curve is actually a utility possibility curve, a generalization of Nash’s utility solution to bargaining.
030: Singular Indifference Curve In statistics, a singular matrix has no solution. Social indifference curve is a singular indifference curve.
028: Cournot & Bargaining This video reveals the unwanted consequence of using two bargaining lines, instead of one.

2. Talmud

013: Talmud I This video proves that the Talmud problems are bargaining problems and the Talmud rule is 50/50.
014: Talmud II This video proves that Talmud did not always apply the 50-50 rule.
015: Talmud III This video shows the clumsy method of “Constrained Equal Award”.
059: Talmud IV This video uses an algorithm to play the Talmud problems with 50-50 rule.
060: Talmud V This video proves that forming coalition to bargain is detrimental
058: Shapley and Talmud III This video uses an algorithm to play the Talmud Bankruptcy Game with Shapley’s method.
054: Shapley and Talmud I This video uses Shapley’s method to play the Contested Garment Game of Talmud
055: Shapley and Talmud II This video uses Shapley’s method to play the Bankruptcy Game of Talmud
056: Shapley I This video plays Shapley’s Glove Game.
057: Shapley II This video proves that Shapley’s method is detrimental to workers in wage negotiation.

3. Embezzlement

064: Agency Dilemma I This video proves that the manager would embezzle the whole pie, had he had his own indifference curve.
065: Agency Dilemma II This video proves that the manager might embezzle more than the whole pie, if embezzlement price could be made lower.
067: Agency Dilemma IV This video proves that Laffont and Tirole gave the whole profit to the manager
066: Agency Dilemma III This video proves that policing or outsourcing may ruin the bargaining problem at all.
323: Shavell I This video disproves the maximisation on expected utility.
324: Shavell II This video further disproves the maximisation on expected utility.
325: Shavell III This video discloses a blatant lie by Shavell.
326: Shavell IV This video proves that it is hard to lure worker to put more effort.

4. Contract

327: GH I This video proves that Contract Theory is the same as the Principal-Agency Dilemma.
329: GH III This video shows an example of the abuse of inverse function.
330: GH IV This video shows how Grossman and Hart inflict higher cost to the principal.

5. Public Choice

328: GH II This video tells the difference between the theory of the firm and bargaining.
368: Signaling I This video reproduces Spence’s Signaling theory.
369: Signaling II This video shows how Spence destroyed his own signalling theory.
370: Signaling III This video rescues Spence’s signaling theory.
371: Signaling IV This video disproves the cost part of Spence’s signalling theory.

9. Match & Searching

375: Search Theory I This video disproves Diamond’s search theory.
376: Search Theory II This video further disproves Diamond’s search theory.
377: Search Theory III This video still further disproves Diamond’s search theory.

10. Lobbying

373: Matching This video shows how Mortensen and Pissarides have completed a tautological cycle.
047: Just Taxation I This video proves that marginal utility of cost is increasing, the reverse of the diminishing law of marginal utility.
048: Just Taxation II This video shows that Musgrave’s demand curve for public good lies below the zero-cost line.
049: Just Taxation III It is purely accidental for three lines to intersect at one point. This video shows how Clark has cheated us to obtain that point.
146: Club House This video proves that Buchanan’s club house theory is contradictory.

6. Auction

050: Just Taxation IV To add two parts together to obtain the designated sum is accidental. This video shows how Clark has cheated us to obtain that sum.
051: Auction I Subsidy to suppliers may perhaps solve the shortage problem, but discount to customers will only aggravate it. This video disproves the Lerner-Vickrey theory of control.
052: Auction II Vickrey postulates a logistic bidding function, but his mathematics applies the uninteresting straight-line function.
053: Auction III This video explains why Google adopts the Vickrey second price auction theory.
061: Auction Voting I This video shows that VL Smith’s forced price theory is Nash unsolved bargaining problem.
062: Auction Voting II This video shows how VL Smith destroys his own perfect pricing theory.

7. Timing

036: Timing of Payment I This video shows that the timing-of-payment model must first solve the bargaining problem, or a common price for the buyer and the seller.
037: Timing of Payment II This video proves that payment ex-ante and payment ex-post are equivalent with litigation.
038: Timing of Payment III This video shows that it is upside-down logic to pay a lazy worker higher wage, and an absent worker the whole wage.
039: Timing of Payment IV This video proves that when some functions are already the optimal conditions, further optimization is redundant.

8. Signaling

161: Regulation III This video proves that Becker’s lobbying theory is searching in the wrong direction and finds no solution.
162: Regulation IV This video proves that Becker’s lobbying theory is wasteful.