1. Nash 

016: Nash Bargaining I  This video proves that Nash’s utility method to bargaining leads to unfairness. 
017: Nash Bargaining II  This video proves that Nash’s exchange does not result in his Pareto Optimum. 
018: Nash Bargaining III  This video proves that Nash’s exchange is nothing but Ricardo’s trade theory, without any solution to the gain from trade. 
027: Bargaining in a Box  This video reveals the many possibilities of solving the bargaining problem with the Edgeworth box. 
029: Lindahl & Bargaining  This video shows that in case of benefit everybody wants more. 
031: UPC & Bargaining  This video proves that social indifference curve is actually a utility possibility curve, a generalization of Nash’s utility solution to bargaining. 
030: Singular Indifference Curve  In statistics, a singular matrix has no solution. Social indifference curve is a singular indifference curve. 
028: Cournot & Bargaining  This video reveals the unwanted consequence of using two bargaining lines, instead of one. 
2. Talmud 

013: Talmud I  This video proves that the Talmud problems are bargaining problems and the Talmud rule is 50/50. 
014: Talmud II  This video proves that Talmud did not always apply the 5050 rule. 
015: Talmud III  This video shows the clumsy method of “Constrained Equal Award”. 
059: Talmud IV  This video uses an algorithm to play the Talmud problems with 5050 rule. 
060: Talmud V  This video proves that forming coalition to bargain is detrimental 
058: Shapley and Talmud III  This video uses an algorithm to play the Talmud Bankruptcy Game with Shapley’s method. 
054: Shapley and Talmud I  This video uses Shapley’s method to play the Contested Garment Game of Talmud 
055: Shapley and Talmud II  This video uses Shapley’s method to play the Bankruptcy Game of Talmud 
056: Shapley I  This video plays Shapley’s Glove Game. 
057: Shapley II  This video proves that Shapley’s method is detrimental to workers in wage negotiation. 
3. Embezzlement 

064: Agency Dilemma I  This video proves that the manager would embezzle the whole pie, had he had his own indifference curve. 
065: Agency Dilemma II  This video proves that the manager might embezzle more than the whole pie, if embezzlement price could be made lower. 
067: Agency Dilemma IV  This video proves that Laffont and Tirole gave the whole profit to the manager 
066: Agency Dilemma III  This video proves that policing or outsourcing may ruin the bargaining problem at all. 
323: Shavell I  This video disproves the maximisation on expected utility. 
324: Shavell II  This video further disproves the maximisation on expected utility. 
325: Shavell III  This video discloses a blatant lie by Shavell. 
326: Shavell IV  This video proves that it is hard to lure worker to put more effort. 
4. Contract 

327: GH I  This video proves that Contract Theory is the same as the PrincipalAgency Dilemma. 
329: GH III  This video shows an example of the abuse of inverse function. 
330: GH IV  This video shows how Grossman and Hart inflict higher cost to the principal. 
5. Public Choice 

328: GH II  This video tells the difference between the theory of the firm and bargaining. 
368: Signaling I  This video reproduces Spence’s Signaling theory. 
369: Signaling II  This video shows how Spence destroyed his own signalling theory. 
370: Signaling III  This video rescues Spence’s signaling theory. 
371: Signaling IV  This video disproves the cost part of Spence’s signalling theory. 
9. Match & Searching 

375: Search Theory I  This video disproves Diamond’s search theory. 
376: Search Theory II  This video further disproves Diamond’s search theory. 
377: Search Theory III  This video still further disproves Diamond’s search theory. 
10. Lobbying 

373: Matching  This video shows how Mortensen and Pissarides have completed a tautological cycle. 
047: Just Taxation I  This video proves that marginal utility of cost is increasing, the reverse of the diminishing law of marginal utility. 
048: Just Taxation II  This video shows that Musgrave’s demand curve for public good lies below the zerocost line. 
049: Just Taxation III  It is purely accidental for three lines to intersect at one point. This video shows how Clark has cheated us to obtain that point. 
146: Club House  This video proves that Buchanan’s club house theory is contradictory. 
6. Auction 

050: Just Taxation IV  To add two parts together to obtain the designated sum is accidental. This video shows how Clark has cheated us to obtain that sum. 
051: Auction I  Subsidy to suppliers may perhaps solve the shortage problem, but discount to customers will only aggravate it. This video disproves the LernerVickrey theory of control. 
052: Auction II  Vickrey postulates a logistic bidding function, but his mathematics applies the uninteresting straightline function. 
053: Auction III  This video explains why Google adopts the Vickrey second price auction theory. 
061: Auction Voting I  This video shows that VL Smith’s forced price theory is Nash unsolved bargaining problem. 
062: Auction Voting II  This video shows how VL Smith destroys his own perfect pricing theory. 
7. Timing 

036: Timing of Payment I  This video shows that the timingofpayment model must first solve the bargaining problem, or a common price for the buyer and the seller. 
037: Timing of Payment II  This video proves that payment exante and payment expost are equivalent with litigation. 
038: Timing of Payment III  This video shows that it is upsidedown logic to pay a lazy worker higher wage, and an absent worker the whole wage. 
039: Timing of Payment IV  This video proves that when some functions are already the optimal conditions, further optimization is redundant. 
8. Signaling 

161: Regulation III  This video proves that Becker’s lobbying theory is searching in the wrong direction and finds no solution. 
162: Regulation IV  This video proves that Becker’s lobbying theory is wasteful. 